This study considers the impact of trustworthiness on financial markets at the individual transaction level. We employ a natural experiment using the peer-to-peer lending site, Prosper.com. We find that borrowers who are perceived as less trustworthy are economically and significantly less likely to have their loan requests filled, even controlling for physical attractiveness, detailed demographic information, credit profile, income, education, employment and loan-specific information. Indeed, a borrower perceived as trustworthy can promise an interest rate 182 basis points lower than a less trustworthy borrower and have the same likelihood of being funded. These results suggest that agents' perceptions of trustworthiness are important, even in relatively information-rich environments.
Economists have long recognized that trust could, in principal, play an important role in markets and encourage economic activity. 1 In this context, trust is defined as an agent's prior probability that a potential counterparty is willing to perform her contractual obligations. The mechanism linking trust to economic activity in the literature is that individuals' opinions about potential counterparties or the financial system in general impacts their willingness to engage in transactions or other cooperative endeavors. Researchers have used this mechanism to advance a number of hypotheses about aggregate effects of this behavior on economic performance, including correlations between the average degree of trust in an individual country and its rate of growth, the quality of its institutions and the degree of individual participation in the stock market. However, as Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) note, it is difficult to assess the direction of causality when analyzing the correlation between levels of trust and various economic outcomes. Perhaps as a result of this point, as Solow (1995) notes, some economists doubt the impact of trust on economic outcomes.
This paper aims to test the hypothesis that when transacting people use their assessments of potential counterparties' trustworthiness in an economically significant manner. This is a fundamental question because the mechanism suggested in the literature for how trust might cause increased economic activity requires that agents act on their views of their opposite numbers' trustworthiness when deciding to contract. Moreover, while it is perhaps obvious that trust would matter for transactions in the absence of information, it is not 1 obvious that trust should matter at all in a modern society with cheap and widely available information about both potential counterparties and the system as whole. For instance, it
is not obvious that lenders in possession of a potential borrower's credit rating and other financial information would have any need to put much weight on their priors about the potential borrower's trustworthiness when contemplating making a loan.
The advent of peer-to-peer lending sites such as Prosper.com provide a natural environment in which to consider this question. Prosper.com conducts auctions where lenders can bid on potential borrowers' loan requests, called listings. Prosper.com provides the lenders with detailed information about potential borrowers, including their photographs. Lenders can use this information, including the photographs, when deciding whether or not to bid in a particular auction. This setting is particularly advantageous for studying the effects of trustworthiness for at least three reasons. First, the fact that borrowers submit photographs for potential lenders to review allows us to propose novel proxies for perceived trustworthiness based on the appearance of the individuals in the photographs. In most situations, researchers do not have such direct proxies for the perceived trustworthiness of transaction participants. Instead, researchers typically only have access to financial information related to the borrowers' creditworthiness, such as a credit rating. This is problematic in this context because creditworthiness reflects both potential borrowers' willingness and ability to fulfill their obligations. Trustworthiness, however, reflects only the borrowers' willingness to perform their contractual obligations. Without a proxy for trustworthiness per se, researchers cannot distinguish the effects of variation in perceived trustworthiness and variation in the borrowers' ability to perform their obligations. We use the photographs available on Prosper.com to construct measures of perceived trustworthiness from the borrowers' appearance alone. As such our measures are minimally tainted by-if not completely free of-assessments of the borrowers' ability to repay the loan. Furthermore, our measures are exogenous to the transaction because they are constructed based on the observations of third parties who are unable to affect the outcome of the transaction. As a consequence, our results do not suffer from concerns about reverse causality.
Second, while techniques in experimental economics (such as the trust game) could be employed as an alternative means of addressing our question, our approach has the advantage of involving data from a real market. As Levitt and List (2006) point out, experimental methods suffer from a number of problems that do not affect data from real markets, including the tendency of subjects to alter their behavior due to the presence of researchers observing their behavior, the fact that experiments typically involve small sums of money, and the fact that the experiments do not mimic the incentives that agents have in real-world situations. Our data, on the other hand, come from a real market where the participants' behavior are not affected by the presence of researchers watching them and where the amount of money at stake is significant to them.
Third, in most situations, researchers have no access to transactions in which the parties decided not to contract. Without access to transactions that were not consummated, it is impossible for researchers to analyze whether agents are more likely to contract with those they trust or deem trustworthy. On Prosper.com we have access to all requests for loans, 3 including the unsuccessful ones.
Our approach begins by assessing the perceived trustworthiness of the individuals requesting loans, using only their photographs. To build measures of potential borrowers' trustworthiness we employ a service provided by Amazon.com, known as Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is a market platform that brings together individuals who wish to find work with individuals who have tasks to be completed. We ask 25 distinct MTurk workers to assess the trustworthiness of the person or people in each of the photographs in our database and we compute measures of trustworthiness for each listing based on their responses. 2 Next we show that our measures of perceived trustworthiness are related to the borrower's actual trustworthiness by documenting that these measures predict both credit grades as well as the probability that the borrower will default on their loan. Interestingly, our measures of trustworthiness perform nearly as well as some traditional financial measures of creditworthiness in predicting credit grade. For instance, univariate regressions of a potential borrower's credit grade on our trustworthiness proxies result in R 2 s from 1% to 1.7%, while univariate regressions of the credit grade on traditional credit profile variables (debt-to-income ratio, home ownership, length of credit history, number of delinquencies, number of credit inquiries and number of credit lines) have a median R 2 of around 3%. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that our measures of trustworthiness help forecast default even after controlling for credit grades and other financial information. This indicates that borrowers' photographs offer relevant information about trustworthiness that is not embedded in the standard model 2 As an aside, we note that by allowing researchers to perform repetitive tasks that would be difficult to program a computer to do, MTurk has the potential to be a useful research tool. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research paper to use MTurk. 4 used for credit scoring.
Finally, we show that controlling for the interest rate offered by the potential borrower, detailed financial information, and demographic information conveyed by the photographs (such as sex, ethnicity and age), perceived trustworthiness is significantly positively related to the number of bids the potential borrower's listing receives as well as the likelihood of the loan request being funded. Furthermore, we show that the effect is economically significant.
A borrower deemed trustworthy receives an average of five additional bids in their auction, which is a 25% increase over the average auction. Furthermore, a borrower who appears trustworthy can promise an interest rate about 182 basis points lower than a borrower who appears less trustworthy and has the same probability of being funded. This finding is all the more significant because the environment in which borrowers and lenders operate on Prosper.com is relatively information rich, since potential lenders have access to complete financial profiles of borrowers including credit grades, income, and employment. It is likely that the trustworthiness effect we document would be even larger in environments that are more opaque and in which objective information is less plentiful. We believe this is the first study to document a trustworthiness discount.
Our paper contributes to a literature comprised of a number of studies that provide evidence that a survey-based, country level trust measure from the World Value Survey is correlated with economic activity, for instance, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Knack and Keefer (1997) . 3 An alternative hypothesis for the results in this literature is that the correlations between the World Value Survey trust measure and economic aggregates do not arise because individuals' trust with respect to other agents leads to increased economic activity, but rather because individuals in prosperous countries are simply more inclined to say that they trust others. If the correlations between economic activity and country-level trust measures arise because agents are more willing to contract with those they trust, or deem trustworthy, then we expect that in our data, lenders would be more willing to loan to potential borrowers they deem trustworthy. On the other hand, if the causality is reversed, then controlling for ability to repay the loan, there would be no relation between our trustworthiness measure and the outcome of the lending decision.
Furthermore, because our work directly tests the hypothesis that individuals consider the trustworthiness of their potential counterparties when deciding to engage in financial transactions, our paper also adds to the evidence in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008). Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) present a model in which investors consider their perceived probability of being cheated when investing in risky assets. They also provide empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis by documenting a positive correlation between individual Dutch families' stock market participation and their response to the World Value Survey trust question. Finally, our approach for measuring trustworthiness is free from the problem advanced against survey-based measures. Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) raise doubts about what the question in the World Values Survey actually measures. Indeed, using surveys and variations of the trust game, they show that answers to the attitudinal survey questions are more closely related to the trustworthiness of the respondents than to 6 their propensity to trust others. Our approach is not subject to this criticism because we employ third parties that are not involved in the actual transaction to measure the perceived trustworthiness of the potential borrowers. As a result, the behavior of the people measuring trustworthiness cannot have any effect on the actual outcome of the loan transaction.
Other recent studies have also considered peer-to-peer lending markets. Ravina (2008) shows that on Prosper.com, physically attractive borrowers are more likely to get loans and pay lower rates, but are also more likely to default. She finds no evidence that perceived trustworthiness of the borrowers affects the probability that the loan will be funded. We find that although attractiveness and perceived trustworthiness are positively correlated, there is no evidence that attractiveness is related to the probability of a loan becoming fully funded after controlling for trustworthiness and that perceived trustworthiness is a significant determinant of the probability that a loan will be funded. We attribute the differences between our findings and those in Ravina's (2008) From these samples, we selected all listings that were not cancelled before funding took place, had a non-missing credit grade and included a photograph containing at least one human.
This process resulted in a final sample of 6,821 listings, 733 of which successfully became fully-funded loans and 3,291 loans.
Each listing and loan in our sample is associated with a number of variables that are either provided by Prosper.com or that we compute using non-photographic information in the potential borrowers' listings. These variables fall into three groups: credit profile information, income and occupation information, and information describing the specific features of the listing. In addition, the fully-funded loans have a set of variables that describe the specific features of the loan (e.g. lender interest rate). The credit profile information includes the applicant's credit grade on a seven point scale, with one being the most creditworthy and seven being the least. 5 In addition, each listing contains detailed information about the potential borrower's finances, including delinquencies in the prior seven years, the number of current delinquencies, the potential borrower's debt-to-income ratio, and the total balance and their descriptions can be found in Table 1 .
Photograph analysis using MTurk
Since this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first research paper to use Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk), we present a brief description of the MTurk service below.
MTurk acts as a market platform that brings together individuals who have work to offer (Requesters) with individuals who wish to find work (Workers). Requesters submit tasks to Amazon's MTurk website for Workers to complete. The tasks are referred to as "Human
Intelligence Tasks" (HITs). The Requesters design the tasks, pre-pay Amazon for the work, and receive the results. Workers can log on to the site whenever they choose and view offered wage rates for particular tasks as well as the details of the work the tasks involve. Workers can then choose the tasks they wish to perform (provided they meet the qualifications and requirements set by the Requester) and are guaranteed payment by Amazon. For Requesters,
MTurk offers access to a large workforce capable of completing thousands of HITs per hour.
The benefit of such a workforce is that Workers can quickly and easily solve many problems that would be difficult for a computer to perform without extensive and costly programming. 7 These problems include certain data cleanup tasks, video transcribing, cataloging, and image tagging. We use MTurk to gather demographic information conveyed by the photographs as well as subjective impressions of the people in the photographs. To ensure accurate and truthful responses from the Workers on MTurk, only Workers with an approval rating of 95% or above were allowed to complete HITs. To understand the demographics of the MTurk Workers, we surveyed a subsample of Workers that performed our HITs. Table 2 displays the demographic information of a sample of 903 Workers for which we have some information. These workers performed a total of 103,565 HITs. The data in Table 2 indicate that the Workers are, on 7 The term 'Mechanical Turk' refers to the purported chess playing automaton, called the Turk, built in the late 18th century by Wolfgang von Kempelen (1734-1804). In fact, the Turk was a hoax that relied on a human operator; see, for instance, Standage (2002) . Workers on MTurk are similar to the Turk's operator in the sense that they cheaply perform tasks which would require extensive and costly programming for a computer to perform. Table 1 .
To gauge the attractiveness as well as the perceived trustworthiness of the people in the photographs, we ask the Workers the following questions: "Rate the trustworthiness of this person/these people (in the foreground)" and "Rate the attractiveness of this person/these people (in the foreground)." Workers use a five point scale with which to respond where 1 is least trustworthy/attractive and 5 is most trustworthy/attractive. We also ask for their subjective assessment of the probability (in steps of 10% from 0 to 100%) that the person(s) in 13 the photograph are likely to repay a $100 loan. 8 The Workers' assessments reflect only their ex-ante view of the borrowers' trustworthiness based on their photographs. To the extent that the Workers' are not good at making judgments about trustworthiness based on appearance alone, our tests will be biased against finding anything; however, as we show below, the measures of trustworthiness we construct based on the Workers' observations perform well as measures of trustworthiness.
As the answers to these questions are subjective, each photograph is evaluated by 25 distinct Workers. In addition, in order to best match the subjective perceptions of Prosper.com's US-based lenders, we allowed only US-based Workers to answer these questions.
We chose to have 25 Workers evaluate the photographs in order to balance the cost of in- If a listing or loan has multiple photographs, we average the response measures across all of the photographs associated with the listing or loan.
Since   and   are both proxies for trustworthiness but are not perfectly correlated, we adjust them for comparability so that both variables are measured on the same scale and combine them to form a trustworthiness index:
The   __ is computed using   _ and   _.
Finally, we compute two indicator variables for trustworthiness and attractiveness The high trustworthiness indicator,   is equal to one if the listing or loan has a medianbased trustworthiness index greater than or equal to the third quartile. An observation has 15 a high attractiveness indicator (   ) equal to one if    _ is greater than the third quartile. Panel B of Table 1 provides a detailed description of the construction of all trustworthiness and attractiveness variables. of the loans are associated with female borrowers and only 14% of the loans are associated with black adults, suggesting that the likelihood of either group being funded is lower than it is for male and for non-black applicants. However, these differences in funding probabilities do not necessarily imply disparate-treatment discrimination, as default probabilities can be different for these groups.
Summary Statistics
10 Table 4 reports simple correlation coefficients together with p-values for the test that the correlation coefficient is zero. The correlation coefficients reported in the first ten rows suggest that all measures of trustworthiness and attractiveness are significantly positively correlated with each other, with generally higher correlations between trustworthiness and repayment than between these two variables and measures of attractiveness. The last row of Table 4 presents correlation coefficients between a funding indicator on the one hand and trustworthiness and attractiveness on the other. While the correlation for measures of trustworthiness is always statistically positive ranging from 3.8% to 6.3%, the correlation for the three attractiveness variables is overall close to zero.
In this section we analyze whether our perceived trustworthiness measures are related to the borrowers' actual trustworthiness. To this end, we first analyze whether our trustworthiness variables predict the borrower's past credit performance as measured by their Prosper.com credit grade. We then consider whether the trustworthiness proxies can predict defaults.
Having done so, we analyze whether potential borrowers' trustworthiness impacts their ability to attract lenders willing to fund their loan requests. While the credit profile, income and education controls were not available to the Workers, these variables are, not surprisingly, strongly related to credit grades. Despite the presence of these controls, however, the trustworthiness proxies remain significant. Furthermore, the relation between the trustworthiness measures and credit grades is economically significant.
Credit grades and perceived trustworthiness
Using the results from specification 7, everything else constant, an individual perceived as less trustworthy has, on average, a credit grade about 0.41 lower than an individual perceived as trustworthy. Using the coefficients from specification 21, an individual perceived as less trustworthy has a credit grade about 0.13 lower than an individual perceived as trustworthy.
This translates into a difference in promised interest rates of between 33 and 100 basis points per annum.
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These results are perhaps surprising because they suggest that individuals who are given access to nothing but a photograph provided by a potential borrower can make subjective assessments about a borrower's trustworthiness that will contain valuable information about the borrower's actual creditworthiness not contained in a linear specification involving the financial information that forms the typical basis for determining a borrower's credit grade.
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These results also suggest that the individuals who appear trustworthy are, on average, worthy of trust. The next section considers the relation between default behavior and perceived trustworthiness. Since the results that follow are not sensitive to the choice of trustworthiness proxy, in the interest of space we proceed using the   __ and   .
To assess the relation between default and our trustworthiness proxies, we estimate Cox models for default. As with other proportional hazard models, the Cox model assumes that the hazard rate (()) is the product of a baseline hazard rate ( 0 ()) that varies only with loan age, but not across other loan characteristics, and the exponential of the explanatory variables () multiplied by a vector of constants . 13 In contrast to other proportional hazard models, however, the Cox model does not provide direct estimates of the baseline hazard but instead focuses on the extent to which explanatory variables increase or decrease the baseline hazard rate:
We use Prosper.com's definition of loan default to estimate our Cox models. Loans are considered in default and become due in full if a scheduled payment is more than four months past due. Our sample contains 761 loan defaults. Each loan made via Prosper.com also provides the borrower with the option to prepay the loan at any time and 20% of the loans in our sample were prepaid. In untabulated results, we find that our trustworthiness variables were not significant predictors of prepayment. Table 6 presents the hazard ratios from the estimated Cox models, ( b ) which reflect the change in the hazard rate due to a one unit increase in the associated variable. As with the regressions in Table 5 , we control for physical attractiveness, demographic information conveyed by the photographs, credit profile information (including credit grade), income and education of the borrower, characteristics of the loan and listing (such as the loan amount), and the number of photographs in the listing. We also include controls for whether the potential borrower is a member of one of Prosper.coms' groups, whether the borrower had been endorsed by another Prosper.com member, and the Prosper.com group leader's compensation rate, if any. In addition, the loan-specific controls include proxies for the information contained in the borrower's written statement. Table 3 Panel B contains a complete list of all the variables in each control group.
As with the results in Table 5 , the first specifications only include proxies for trustworthiness. Both   __ and   have hazard ratios less than one and are significant at conventional levels. This indicates that individuals judged to be more trustworthy are in fact significantly less likely to default on their loans. Indeed, the exponentiated point estimate for the trustworthiness index indicator of 0.6699 suggests that the hazard rate of a loan associated with a trustworthy borrower is 33% lower than the hazard rate of a loan from a less trustworthy borrower. The results are similar when we include attractiveness as a control, which suggests that our trustworthiness proxies are not simply conveying information about the physical attractiveness of the potential borrowers.
Furthermore, our trustworthiness proxies remain significant and are of similar magnitude after controlling for attractiveness, demographic information conveyed by the photographs, credit profile information, income, level of education, and loan-specific information. Figure   1 provides insight into the economic significance of the results by presenting the survival probability as a function of the age of the loan for the average loan as well as for high and 22 low trust loans that are otherwise identical to the average loan. 14 The graph indicates that the survival probabilities are substantially larger for the higher trust loans, with the difference increasing with the age of the loan. Indeed, this graph indicates that a loan made to a seemingly trustworthy borrower has a probability of default approximately 10% smaller than the probability of default of a loan made to a borrower perceived as less trustworthy.
These results are perhaps surprising, as they suggest that people are able to provide useful information about future loan performance in terms of default simply as a result of a brief look at a photograph.
One question that our results are not able to answer is just what it is about a person's
appearance that signals to others that they are willing to meet their obligations. Thus, it is at least plausible that a related mechanism causes facial features to be associated with a high value on reputation.
Funding and perceived trustworthiness
To test whether agents take the trustworthiness of their potential counterparties into account when deciding whether to contract, we perform two sets of tests. First, we examine whether   __ and   are positively related to the number of bids each listing receives. Second, we model the probability of a listing being funded as a function of the trustworthiness proxies. Table 7 presents the coefficient estimates from regressions of the number of bids received by each listing either   __ or   along with control variables. The first two specifications in Table 7 include only the trustworthiness proxies, both of which are positively and highly significantly related to the number of bids received. Both   __ and   remain significant with similar estimated coefficients after controlling for attractiveness. This indicates that the physical attractiveness of the potential borrower is not driving the relation between the trustworthiness proxies and the number of bids received. Furthermore, the coefficients on   __ and   remain positive and significant even after controlling, not only for attractiveness, but for demographic information about the borrower, the borrower's credit profile, income and education information and loan and listing specific characteristics. Panel A of Table 3 displays the complete list of controls.
Moreover, the coefficient on   in specification 6 indicates that a borrower 24 deemed trustworthy receives an average of five additional bids in their auction, a 25% increase over the average auction. After the inclusion of the additional control variables, the attractiveness proxies are negative and significant at the ten percent level. This indicates that, if anything, everything else constant more attractive borrowers attract fewer bid than less attractive borrowers. Table 8 presents the results from a number of probit regressions, each modeling the probability of a listing on Prosper.com becoming a fully-funded loan. As in the previous section, we include several groups of controls. These include attractiveness, the demographic information conveyed by the photograph, the borrowers' credit profile, income and education, and listing-specific information, including both the amount requested and the borrowers' maximum interest rate. Panel A of Table 3 displays the complete list of controls.
The first two specifications include only   __ and   .
Both   __ and   have marginal effects (0.0012 and 0.0406, respectively) that are significant at conventional levels. As the results of the next two specifications indicate, these marginal effects remain significant and similar in magnitude even after controlling for attractiveness. Furthermore, the coefficients on   __ and   remain statistically significant, even after controlling for the demographic information conveyed by the photograph, the information in the borrower's credit profile, information about the borrower's income and education as well as loan and listing-specific information, including the promised interest rate.
The absolute magnitude of the marginal effects on   __ and   25 in Table 8 may appear small. However, to assess their economic significance, we compute the decrease in the promised interest rate that would be required to keep the probability of funding the same between a less trustworthy and a trustworthy borrower, all else being constant. This can be calculated by dividing the marginal effect on   by the marginal effect on the promised interest rate. Using the results in specification 6, we find that a trustworthy person (i.e.   = 1) can promise an interest rate 182 basis points per annum lower than a person for whom   = 0 and have the same probability of being funded, even controlling for all of the demographic, credit profile, income, education and listing-specific information possessed by lenders on Prosper.com. 15 Thus, trustworthiness seems to be associated with a substantial discount in economic terms.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to present empirical estimates of the value of trustworthiness in a market.
Conclusion
This paper studies a fundamental question: whether individuals use their judgment about their potential counterparties' trustworthiness when contracting. This paper contributes to a growing literature on trust in finance and economics that considers the correlations between country-level measures of trust and aggregate measures of economic development. 16 One difficulty with empirical work in this literature is that it is not clear whether increased levels of trust between individuals leads to greater economic activity, or whether people 15 The estimated marginal effect of the maximum interest rate the borrower is willing to pay is 0.5653 in specification 6 of Table 8 . 16 See for instance Fukuyama (1995) 26 from prosperous and economically active countries are just more inclined to be trusting. By using transaction-level auction data from the peer-to-peer lending site Prosper.com and a new, exogenous measure for trustworthiness, we are able to examine whether agents consider potential counterparties' trustworthiness when deciding whether or not to lend. If the correlations between economic activity and country-level trust measures arise because agents are more willing to contract with those they trust or deem trustworthy, then we expect that in our data lenders would be more willing to loan to potential borrowers they deem trustworthy. On the other hand, if the causality is reversed, then controlling for ability to repay the loan, there would be no relation between the perceived trustworthiness of the borrower and the outcome of the lending decision. We find that, controlling for a large set of financial and demographic information about potential borrowers, more seemingly trustworthy borrowers are more likely to be funded than borrowers deemed less trustworthy. Furthermore, a trustworthy borrower can promise an interest rate 182 basis points per annum lower than a less trustworthy borrower in order to have the same likelihood of receiving a loan. Because this paper directly tests the hypothesis that individuals consider the trustworthiness of their potential counterparties when deciding to engage in financial transactions, it also adds to the theoretical and empirical work in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) that suggests that investors differ in their propensity to invest in risky assets depending on the trust they place in others. The debt-to-income ratio of the borrower at the time the listing was created. This value is truncated at 10.01 (so any actual debt to income ratio larger than 1000% will be returned as 1001%). Homeowner Indicator An indicator variables that equals one if the borrower is a verified homeowner at the time the listing was created and zero otherwise.
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Length of Credit History (in months)
The time (in months) between the date the first line of credit was recorded for a borrower and the time the listing was created time the listing was created. Number of Delinquencies (currently)
The number of current delinquencies at the time the listing was created. Number of Delinquencies (last 7 years)
The number of delinquencies in the seven years prior to the creation of the listing. Number of Credit Inquiries (last 6 months)
The number of inquiries in the six months prior to the creation of the listing. Number of Public Records (last 10 years)
The number of public records in the ten years prior to the creation of the listing.
Number of Total Credit Lines
The number of total credit lines at the time the listing was created. College Indicator An indicator variable that equals one if, based on the borrower's self-reported occupation, the borrower is likely to have a college degree and zero otherwise Fraction of Complex Words Used (in %)
The fraction of complex words (in %) out of all words used in the listing text. A complex word is defined as a word with three or more syllables. 
Number of Bids
The number of bids is the total number of bids placed on a listing. This number can be greater than zero even if the listing is not fully funded.
Funding Indicator
An indicator that equals one if a listing is fully funded and becomes a loan and zero otherwise.
Maximum Interest Rate
The maximum interest rate the borrower is willing to pay when the listing was created.
Borrower Rate
The rate the borrower pays on the loan. The rate is computed as the Lender Rate plus the Group Leader Reward Rate (if applicable) and the Bank Draft Fee Annual Rate (if applicable).
L d R t Th t th t l d i th l Lender Rate
The rate that lenders receive on the loan. Loan Amount (in '000)
The requested loan amount in thousands of USD. "Close Auction when Funded" Indicator An indicator that equals one if the listing closes as soon as it is funded 100%.
Number of Photographs
The number of photographs associated with a listing.
Number of Words in Listing Text
The number of words used by the borrower in the listing text.
Number of Words in Listing Text (squared)
The square of the Number of Words in Listing Text variable.
Number of Prior Listings
The number of listings submitted prior to the current listing. Endorsement Indicator An indicator that equals one if another Prosper member has endorsed the borrower and zero otherwise.
Group Membership Indicator
An indicator that equals one if the borrower is a member of a Prosper group and zero otherwise. p p q p g p Group Leader Reward Rate
The percentage reward which is kept by the group leader. The variable is zero if the borrower is not a member of group.
Listing Start Date
The date at which a listing was created. Bank Draft Fee Annual Rate
The rate charged by the bank when the payment option selected is not Electronic Funds Transfer.
Default Indicator An indicator that equals one if the loan status is "Defaulted (Bankruptcy)", "Defaulted (Delinquency)", "Charge-off", or "4+ months late" and zero otherwise. Prepayment Indicator An indicator that equals one if the loan is prepaid in full and zero otherwise.
Loan Origination Date
The date at which the loan was originated. Loan Age (in days since origination)
The time (in days) between the Loan Origination Date and the date of the last available loan performance data performance data. Recovery (conditional on final settlement)
The fraction of the outstanding loan balance that is recovered in the case of default. Table 1 presents the definition of all the variables used in this study. Panel A displays all the variables that are either provided by Prosper or derived from variables provided by Prosper. Panel B contains the variables built from the analysis of the photographs in Prosper by Mechanical Turk Workers. The demographic information in the photographs has been evaluated by two distinct Workers. Workers have identified the number of men, women, and children in each photograph. Workers have also provided estimates of the age, ethnicity, and obesity of each adult in each photograph. The trustworthiness and attractiveness information in the photographs has been evaluated by 25 distinct Workers. Workers have rated the trustworthiness and attractiveness of the person(s) in the foreground of each photograph on a scale between 1 (least) and 5 (most). Workers have also been asked with which probability (in steps of 10%-points from zero to 100%) they would expect repayment of a hypothetical loan of USD 100 by the person(s) in the photograph. 
Variable Name Variable Definition
Demographic Information
Female Indicator An indicator variable that equals one if at least one worker identified at least one female adult in at least one of the photographs associated with a listing or loan while no male adult were identified by any worker. The indicator equals zero otherwise. Couple Indicator An indicator variable that equals one if at least one photograph associated with a listing or loan contains one female adult and one male adult and zero otherwise.
Kid(s) Indicator An indicator variable that equals one if at least one worker identified at least one person below the age of 18 in at least one of the photographs associated with a listing or loan and zero otherwise Young Adults Indicator An indicator variable that equals one if at least one worker identified at least one person above the age of 18, but below the age of 40 in at least one of the photographs associated with a listing or loan while no older adults were identified by any worker. The indicator equals zero otherwise. Old Adults Indicator An indicator variable that equals one if at least one worker identified at least one person above the age of 60 in at least one of the photographs associated with a listing or loan while no younger adults were identified by any worker. The indicator equals zero otherwise. Black Indicator
An indicator variable that equals one if at least one worker identified at least one black adult in at least one of the photographs associated with a listing or loan and zero otherwise. Asian Indicator
An indicator variable that equals one if at least one worker identified at least one Asian adult in at least one of the photographs associated with a listing or loan and zero otherwise. Obesity
The average (across two workers) obesity rating of the adult(s) in the photograph associated with a listing or loan. If multiple photographs are associated with a listing or loan, the variable represents the average across different photographs. Obesity estimates are expressed on a scale between one (not overweight) and three (definitely overweight) (definitely overweight). Table 4 presents pair-wise correlations between measures of trustworthiness and attractiveness as well as credit grade and the funding indicator. We also report the corresponding p-value for the test that correlations coefficient equals zero. See Table 1 for a detailed description of all variables. Table 3 Panel A for a definition of the control variables. See Table 1 for a detailed description of all variables. Table 6 presents hazard ratios from a Cox default model. Default occurs when payments on a loan are 4-month or more late. The model is estimated using all 3,291 loans. For each variable, we report the hazard ratio as well as the p-value associated with the test whether the hazard ratio is equal to 1. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. See Table 3 Panel B for a definition of the sets of control variables. See Table 1 for a detailed description of all variables. Table 7 presents results from an OLS regression of the number of bids on a given listing onto trustworthiness, attractiveness, and different sets of control variables. The model is estimated using all 6,821 listings. For each variable, we report the coefficient estimate as well as the p-value associated with the test whether the coefficient estimate is equal to 0. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. See Table 3 Panel A for a definition of the sets of control variables. See Table 1 for a detailed description of all variables. Table 8 presents results from a probit regression of funding success. Funding success is one if a listings is fully funded and becomes a loan, zero in all other cases. The model is estimated using all 6,821 listings. For each variable, we report the marginal effect (evaluated at the sample mean) as well as the p-value associated with the test whether the marginal effect is equal to 0. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. See Table 3 Panel A for a definition of the sets of control variables. See Table 1 for a detailed description of all variables. Loan Age (months) Figure 1 presents the probability of a loan not defaulting since its origination as function of the loan agethe survival probability. The average survival probability is calculated based on the sample of 3,291 loans. The survival probabilities of loans made to trustworthy and untrustworthy borrowers are calculated from the average survival probability and the point estimate of the HIGHTRUST coefficient of calculated from the average survival probability and the point estimate of the HIGHTRUST coefficient of the Cox model 6 in Table 6 .
